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Ethnic identity is explained through the lens of collective action theory. Like other groups 
(Tribes, Fuedal states, international organizations, nation states, etc.,) ethnic groups are a 
result of an individuals cost-benefit analysis that maximizes wealth and security. External 
variables associated with social relations determine the individual’s cost benefit analysis to 
choose ethnicity over other groups.
However, collective action will not necessarily result just because the group provides 
benefits for its memebers. Indviduals have incentive to consume and not produce collective 
goods. To overcome this problem, at least some individuals must have the incentive to produce 
collective goods that support ethnic groups. This paper illustrates how a rigourous cost benefit 
analysis explains when an individual will have the incentive to provide collective goods.
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So natural seems ethnic identity: common language and religion, shared historical past
— that people rarely stop to think what alternative forms of self-identity exist. Ethnic identity 
is somehow primordial. However, ethnic groups, like all forms of organizing people, such as 
tribes, empires, city states and nation states, are pliable. Individuals mobilize around ethnic 
identity because it provides economic and security needs. Identities change according to 
individual perception of how they can maximize these needs. External variables determine 
how individuals choose their identity (mode of production, military technology, etc.).
The problem with ethnic identity in the former Yugoslavia is that all ethnic groups are 
a potential minority who at one time may face repression at the hands of the majority. The 
only way to ensure economic prosperity and security is to be in the ethnic majority. Ultima­
tely, the state building aspirations of one ethnic group conflicts with others. Everybody wants 
to be in the majority ethnic group. Ethnic groups that win in the state making process 
establish and institutionalize barriers of authority that protect their privileged status and 
material benefits;. The institutional process often includes laws that subject the minority to 
discrimination of economic opportunities, civil rights and physical well being.
The process is never ending. When ethnic minorities mobilize for political autonomy 
their mobilization endangers other minorities who live within the their geographic bounda­
ries, thus creating new minorities. These new ethnic minorities will then try to become the 
majority by succeeding and forming their own political identify. New autonomous units will 
then again have minorities and the whole process repeats itself until specially carved out 
small ghettos of pure ethnic groups are political autonomous units. Eventually, this becomes 
infeasible. The size of these units makes them neither economically nor politically viable 
units. The small cost in governing bureaucratic structure alone is enough to drain the re­
sources of even the wealthiest of nations.
If we can not guarantee the rights of ethnic minorities by allowing them the right to 
self-determination, then how can we protect them from abuse? The best solution is to protect 
the rights of minorities by defining citizenship and rights according to civic identity.
There are two ideal types of nationalism. Ethnic nationalism is an important political 
cleavage based on shared common ancestry, language, and religion. People mobilize around
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their ethnic identity. Civic nationalism is territorially based identity. Rights of individuals 
are determined by residency or birth within the state.1)
Ethnic nationalism will continue to lead to ethnic conflict because by its very nature 
ethnic nationalism excludes and represses those who are not in the majority ethnic group. 
In the former Yugoslavia some ethnic group will be excluded or repressed as long as ethnicity 
is the major political cleavage. What are the causes of ethnic nationalism?
In order to answer these questions I will first review the literature which argues that 
people’s identities are pliable and determined by exogenous variables (e.g., the mode of 
production). The second part of this paper explains the general theoretical premises of col­
lective action theory and why it might be fruitful for future research of the national Question. 
Since Hobbes, collective action theory has been used to explain group solidarity. Within a 
historical framework a rational choice approach allows us to systematically break down the 
individual decision making process and better understand how the structure effects the in­
dividual’s preferences. That is the preference to mobilize around ethnic identity. In the third 
part, I will demonstrates how a rational choice approach can be used to explain ethnic 
nationalism by applying a wide variance of national cases to the model. The purpose of this 
section is not to draw out any final conclusions of any single case of nationalism. Any single 
case can only be explained within its full historical context and by looking closely at what 
exogenous variables contributed to the decision making process. The purpose of this section 
is to simpiy give an illustration of what future research might look at by using a rational 
choice approach. Ultimately deductive thinking will come from comparing exogenous varia­
bles and how they effect an individual’s decision to identity with a political unit.
National Identity, Primordial or Rational?
Ernest Gellner’s contribution to the study of nationalism is fundamental. He was the 
first to realize the modernity of nationalism and to emphasize rationality. Gellner argues 
that nationalism is a result of industrialization. The mode of production determines societal 
organizations (Gellner, 1983).
Gellner argues that nationalism did not exist in Agrarian societies. Agraian societies 
were stratified horizontally with a few elites at the top. These elites were military leaders, 
administrators and clerics. At the bottom, and by far the majority, were peasants and slaves. 
The lower strata needed only labor and no special skills. Stability in Agricultural societies 
would result from the excise of taxes and maintenance of peace. There was little if any 
communication between stratas. Language and literacy further institutionalized stratification.
Industrial society changed the needs of the labor force. Gellner borrows heavily from 
Adam Smith’s explanation that high productivity reuires a complex and mobile division of 
labor. Smith explained that standardized training is the mark of industrialized society. Skills 
required for the labor force were universal. These skills reuired a sharedand thorough edu­
cation in literacy, numeracy, basic work habits and social skills. Gellner theorizes in industrial 
society no special class can dominate the bureaucracy; recruitment is available from the 
population at large. Social barriers are removed. Modem society is egalitarian because it 
requires mobilization.
By providing universal education and language, the industrial process serves to construct 
a social identity. People have a shared medium of culture and atmosphere which the indi­
vidual is dependent on for security. In Agrarian society there was little communication and
On the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism, see Jack Snyder (1993a; 1993b), and Anthony D. 
Smith (1992).
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the lower classes did not have much in common with each other. Universal education and 
language gives people a shared sense of common culture and identity.
Gellner refutes the primordialist argument by pointing out that there are roughly 8,000 
languages spoken in the world and there is no possible way that each can have its own nation 
state. If having a language or a distinct pre-existing culture is the sole requirement for having 
a nation then we would expect many more states. The size of the nation state is ultimately 
determined by other variables than language and culture. Nation states sometimes use pre­
existing culture, sometimes they invent culture and sometimes they obliterate culture.
E.J. Hobsbawm is important to the literature of nationalism for three reasons. First, 
he proposes that the state is a modem territorial entity that developed due to an advanced 
stage of technology (Hobsbawm, 1990a). Second, he has thoroughly traced the process of 
inventing tradition that is used to form social identity (Hobsbsawm, 1983b). Third, while 
Gellner stresses that nationalism and self-identity are constructed from above, Hobsbawn 
looks at nationalism from both above and below. The view of nationalism from below invovles 
what incentives the lower strata of society have in supporting national identity.
Hobsbawm argues that the most intense stage of nationalism occurred between 1870- 
1914. The extreme intensity of nationalism in this period resulted from massive political 
change brought by modernization, urbanization and mass migration. The middle class was 
stuck between the ruling class and the lower class. Their material status was upheld by their 
schooling and their having non-manual jobs. Threatened by groups who challenged their 
material well being, they made claims to superiority and uniqueness. Any threats from the 
lower class, foreign states, individuals, immigrants and capitalist financiers mobilized the 
middle class. By mobilizing around their national identity they were able to exclude those 
outside their group (Hobsbawm, 1990a: 101-130).
The Flemish are an example of linguistic nationalism. The middle class supported bi­
lingual policies in Belgium. There was no special enthusiasm for linguistic nationalism among 
the Flemish ruling elite or from the lower classes. The ruling elites were already bilingual 
and had secure status. The lower class only knew French because it was the most practical 
and they did not have the educational opportunities to learn Flemish. By learning the lan­
guage the middle class could exclude those who did not know Flemish. The ardent supporters 
of official biiiiigLiil’sm were school teachers, minor bureaucrats and journalists. Their em­
ployment depended on iheir knowledge of the language As Hobsbawm argues," The crucial 
moment in the creation of a language as a potential asset is not as a medium of primary 
language but its admission of secondary education..." (Hobsbawm, 1990a: 118). In sum, the 
middle class mobilized around their ethnic identity in order to exclude other and secure 
their own material benefits .
For Gellner and Hobsbawm nationalism is a function of exogenous variables, namely 
the economic mode of organization. The state and national identity are organizations that 
meet the individual’s economic needs. However, organizations are only successful if they are 
able to overcome free riding.
If ethnic nationalism is a way of organizing to meet economic and security needs then 
an effective organization must be able to overcome the collective action problem. In order 
to overcome the obstacle of collective action a successful organization will create institutions 
and ideologies that will motivate an individual to contribute to the group and to limit free 
riding. Ultimately, according to collective action theory, every organization relies on incen­
tive. Thus, Collective action theory explains why certain groups have incentive for organizing 
the state on ethnicity identity. The strength of collective action theory is that it allows us to 
look at the structure’s effect on the individual. Explaining ethnic nationalism then is a process 
of identifying when the strucuture gives incentive to individuals to organize the state on 
ethnicity.
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The Collective Action Problem
According to collective action theory all states have a collective action problem. Col­
lective goods must be provided and free riding stopped (Olson, 1965). Collective goods vary 
for ethnic organizations. Anything that supports organizations can be viewed as a collective 
good. Votes, financial resources, terrorist activities, are all forms of public goods. Collective 
goods then support organizations that provide benefits for all its members. Collective goods 
by their very nature are inexcludable, that is no one can be prevented from using them. In 
the case of ethnic identity a collective good is the establishment of a state that provides the 
security and economic needs of all its members (Hechter, 1982; 1987; Nielsen, 1985).
Collective goods are hard to produce. People will have the incentive to consume col­
lective goods and not to produce them. The individual will not have the incentive to produce 
the public good when all people in the group will benefit. Individuals maximize their interest 
by consuming the public good and using all of their resources to produce goods that only 
they can consume.
Individuals will only contribute collective goods when they perceive private benefits will 
exceed private cost. So in order to explain when an individual will contribute to the collective 
good we must closely look at what goes into their individual calculations of when benefit 
will exceed cost. An individual cost-benefit analysis can be broken down in many ways.2) I 
will use the following basic model:
P • (B-C)
B is the benefit of supporting ethnic identity, C is the potential cost of support, and P 
is the probability of recieving the benefit.3)
Some Examples of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Benefits
Benefits are a crucial variable in determining ethnic solidarity. All organizations exist 
because they provide benefits. There are two important questions concerning benefits. First, 
there is the question of who benefits. Not everyone will benefit equally from ethnic solidarity. 
National movements are led by bureaucrats seeking advancement, economic sectors or po­
tential government leaders. Though nationalism might often be led by narrow interest groups, 
a full explanation of nationalism must go beyond benefits of leaders. Nationalism is a dual 
phenomenon that must be studied from above and below. We can only understand ethnic 
nationalism if we also look at the benefits of who those who are the target of nationalistic 
propaganda. Not everyone will benefit from ethnic solidarity, but that certain coalitions or 
groups within the ethnic group need to benefit in addition to besides the leadership.
What are the benefits that explain why people choose ethnic identity? The key assum­
ption concerning collective action theory is that people maximize their utility. If we say that 
everything can be a benefit, that is that ethnic identity maximizes everything, then the rational 
choice approach only becomes a methodology of breaking down the decision making process. 
If ethnic identities maximize everything then we have little or no predictive power. There 
is no single object or possession that people maximize when choosing ethnic identity. How­
ever, the history of organizational theory argues that states meet the needs of security and 
wealth. Therefore, I will hypothesize that people maximize their security and wealth through 
ethnic identity. If we can explain a large degree of the variance of ethnic identity with the 
assumption that people maximize wealth and security, then explaining an additional minimal
For a more elaborate model of cost-benefit analysis see Hechter (1982). 
This is a very simple cost-benefit model used by Rogowski (1985:88-89).
154
Joseph, B., Ethnie identity and rationality Rev. za soc., Zgb., Vol XXIV (1993), No 3-4: 151-161
amount with three or four additional variables that people maximize may give us richness. 
The richness we gain is at the expense of theoretical rigor that allows clear hypothesis.
Examples of Benefit Analysis
Ethnic Violence recently flared in India after Hindu nationalists tore down a mosque 
built in the sixteenth century. The ethnic violence followed three years of Hindu solidarity 
led by the Bharatiya Janata Party. Formerly, India’s political cleavages were based on caste- 
lines. The upper caste was pitted against the lower caste and other disadvantage groups. As 
a result of ethnic mobilization around Hinduism, religion now divides Indian politics. Hindu 
political leaders were able to manipulate the identity of Hindus so that religion was now the 
major cleavage (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1993:24-29).4)
The upper caste would benefit if India’s government were unable to carry out quota 
reform. India’s government was an alliance between disadvantaged groups, namely the lower 
castes and Muslims. The lower caste had materially benefitted as a result of liberalization 
and modernization. They had demanded quotas in government jobs and education for de­
cades. Thus their demands threaten the jobs and status of India’s urban upper class. By 
mobilizing Hindu identity the upper caste would defeat the coalition that demanded increase 
in quotas for the lower castes and preserve the privileges of the upper caste (Rudolph and 
Rudolph, 1993).
The Hindu upper caste was also threatened by Muslim rising social status. Muslim 
prosperity was resented by Hindu professionals and businessmen who expected them to serve 
in Muslim traditional lower status occupations. Instead, Muslims challenged Hindus in see­
king better jobs. Upper caste frustration, due to lowering economic opportunities, caused 
them to mobilize around Hinduidentity.
Perceived benefits of ethnic solidarity varied among former Soviet nationalities. Charles 
Furtado and Michael Hechter explain varying levels of nationalism in Ukraine and Estonia 
according to the degree of autonomy that elites had from the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU). Hechter and Furtado hypothesize that the more autonomy that national 
elites had from the CPSU, the more likely they were to mobilize around ethnic identity 
(Furtado and Hechter, 1992: 169-204).
Local level elites calculated the relative career chances that the CPSU offered. Local 
party leaders will be less likely to support ethnic identity if promotion to the all union-level 
is possible. Thus those who see their careers being attached to the all union-level will not 
support ethnic nationalism. However, if avenues for advancement are closed or limited, then 
there is a higher probability that the local elites will mobilize around ethnic identity. If elites 
are unable to gain power at the center they will try to build their power base at the republican 
or local level.
The cases of Ukraine and Estonia confirm this hypothesis. Ukrainian elites were well 
represented in the CPSU and at the all Union-level. For local elites the benefits of ethnic 
mobilization were minimal, because the CPSU offered career opportunities. For the Estonian 
elite the CPSU had always been Slav dominated. Blocked avenues to republic and all-Union 
positions gave them no incentive to support the CPSU. The results were a higher degree of 
Estonian elites supporting ethnic mobilization than Ukrainian.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century ethnic identity provided career 
opportunities for Spanish-American elites. Spanish American elite gained career opportuni­
4) For a more general description see Ashutosh Varsheney, (1993:227-262).
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ties that escaped them with Spanish rule (Anderson, 1983:47-65). Elites bom in the Ame­
ricas, yet of European descent, were barred from leadership positions within their own co­
lonies. Even if elites were bom days after their parents’ departure from Spain racial barriers 
denied them access to high positions within their own colonial government.
Not everyone agrees that nationalism is a function of modernization. Liah Greenfeld 
argues that intellectuals who articulate national beliefs and ideology are the crucial variable 
in explaining nationalism. Intellectuals identify with the nation because it preserves their 
status and prestige. For Greenfeld intellectuals maximize status and phychological gratifica­
tion. Thus variances in nationalism will be explained by the ability of the nation to supply 
prestige. When nations are unable to provide prestige, intellectuals will turn to some other 
forms of identity. For example, Greenfeld argues that intellectuals in underdeveloped nations 
will not obtain status from identifying with their nation. Not being able to obtain status, 
intellectuals will then identify with some other form of organization. For many intellectuals 
who lived in non-westem nations this has often been socialism (Greenfeld, 1993:47-62).
The argument is interesting, but not because of the role it attributes to intellectuals. 
Though intellectuals have played a role in nationalism, they are not the only group which 
benefits from national policies. They can not solely determine what social organizations exist. 
However, her argument is interesting because of the type of benefit the state provides in­
tellectuals. By arguing that the nation provides social status, we are able to loosen our 
assumptions of what people maximize. One of her case studies is worth summarizing because 
it illustrates the problem of social status.5)
For Russian Jews, Socialism offered social prestige and dignity. Jews were always di­
sproportionately represented in Marxist parties. Russia was a backwards nation that offered 
no prestige. Czarist Anti-semitism further alienated Jews from their nations. Russian Jews 
optimized prestige by identifying with international organizations and anti- Czarist ideology.
Two methodological problems result when we assume that ethnic identities maximize 
social prestige. First, what is prestige? Psychological gratification can be measured numerous 
ways. There are no objective criteria for social status. Material wealth, titles, and different 
forms of recognition can all be considered phycological gratification. Status not only changes 
from society to society, but from person to person. In the U.S. new wealth carries more 
status than in European states. Some people may think highly of scientists, while others may 
think highly of artists or religious leaders. The effect of material wealth and security, on the 
other hand, can easily be traced. We can accurately trace if someone has materially benefited 
or gained security from their ethnic identity. The second methodological problem is that 
social prestige is highly correlated with wealth. People might not be maximizing social pre­
stige, but wealth. The two variables are correlated; consequently her theory is unfalsifiable.
Probability
Probability is determined by the power (size, resources, etc.) of the group in relzftionship 
to those the group is in conflict with. Power is a relational concept and can not be adequately 
measured by solely looking at a group’s resources. A power relationship is based on the 
ability of person A to make B do something he would not otherwise have done.
Power resources are fungible and situationally determined. However, two of the more 
standard variables that explain a group’s power are its size and resources. The size of a
5* Greenfeld also mentions the case of Benito Mussolini. Before world war I, Mussolini was an ardent socialist 
who advocated kicking out all the party moderates. Italy was backwards and less developed than other western states. 
After World War I Italy showed promise of developing into a respectful nation. Now Italy and nationalism offered 
Mussolini social status.
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group has a positive effect on a group’s power. In a representative system numbers transfer 
into votes. In a potentially violent situation, large numbers transfer into physical force. Ma­
terial and human resources also transfer into political and physical power.
The individual will consider the probability of success based on the nationalist group’s 
power in relationship to its opponents. Opposition to ethnic solidarity will come from do­
mestic or international groups. Secessionists will be opposed by the majority. Irredentism 
will be opposed by whomever they seek to exclude. External groups also determine the 
probability of successful ethnic solidarity. For example, when ethnic minorities either seek 
secession or attempt to stop irredentism neighboring states may intervene, especially when 
the neighboring state’s major ethnic group is the one being victimized (Weiner, 1971:665- 
683). International organizations have many methods to affect the probability of success for 
national groups. Secessionist groups benefit from international recognition, while economic 
embargoes, diplomatic isolation and military intervention discourage irredentism.
The case of India demonstrates the probability variable. The Bharatiya Janata party’s 
rise to power in the early 90’s was a consequence of frustrated upper caste Hindus who tried 
to victimize Muslims and break up a governing coalition that sought to raise government 
quotas for India’s disadvantaged. The probability of success was high. The Muslims only 
represented 11 percent of the population. Polarizing the Indian community on ethnic lines 
instead of traditional class lines increased the probability of success. It was not necessary 
for the upper caste to target the entire coalition of disadvantaged classes, just one fifth of 
the coalition or 11 percent of population (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1993:27-28).
Mikhail Gorbachev’s political reforms increased the probability of political and econo­
mic autonomy. Prior to the Gorbachev’s reforms the CPSU and the authoritarian structure 
had prohibited any mobilization or autonomous political activity. Gorbachev’s commitment 
to economic decentralization and democratic reforms greatly increased the probability of 
successful ethnic identity at the republican level (Furtado and Hechter, 1992).6)
Cost Analysis
Besides benefits and probability, cost analysis plays a crucial role in determining the 
individual’s participation in collective action. Cost is measured by the amount of resources 
that the individual will lose by participating in collective action. Cost can range from loss of 
life to a commitment of a brief period of time or any amount of material resources. The 
theory predicts that the lower the cost, the higher the probability of collective action. Legal 
demonstrations, voting, etc., are less likely to cause individual injury and are more likely to 
attract collective action, than violent protest that may result in severe punishment (Hechter, 
1982:424-431).
External and internal groups impose cost on ethnic solidarity. For irredentist ethnic 
groups this can mean reprisal not only from domestic groups but from the international 
community. Often ethnic minorities who are being subjugated to repression by irredentist 
groups have members in neighboring states who are willing to come to their aid. This aid 
increases the cost of repressing ethnic minorities. Various international organizations also 
can inflict cost on ethnic groups who repress minorities. For Secessionist ethnic group» there 
is almost always conflict from central groups. Conflict may range from open warfare to 
negotiations over material and legal relations. The international community can incur cost 
on secessionist ethnic groups by not recognizing legitimacy of autonomy or by not supplying 
military or economic aid.
6* A further example is the decline of the Spanish empire which increased the probability of Southern American 
nationalism. Spain’s ability to monitor and control its empire was declining. Its resources were drained from colonies 
and continental wars. Thus the decline in Spanish power in relationship to its South American Colonies increased the 
probability of nationalist success.
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Cost of Irredentism
Since 1967, Israelis have occupied the West Bank and the Gaza strip. Palestinians who 
lived outside for work or study at the time of occupation were denied reentry. The result 
was that many families became separated. Family renunciation requests are denied and re­
sidents who marry non-residents are subject to harassment or removal. Palestinians are sub­
jected to death, deportation, abolished housing, strict curfews,and detainment without trial. 
Citizenship in Israel is defined by religion and those who are not Jews are repressed (Gurr, 
1993:219-226).
What is the domestic cost to Israel of defining ethnicity as the criteria of citizenship? 
The Palestinians have violently protested. Terrorist attacks have lead to deaths and property 
damage. Terrorist violence has also hurt the tourist industry. Israel has also used a great 
deal of resources on military expenditures
The cost for Israel’s irredentism has been even higher internationally. There are nearly 
three million Palestinian refugees. These refugees have supported the PLO morally and 
financially. Before the Gulf War Palestinians had political leverage in the Arabian Peninsula 
states. They still have significant leverage in Jordan and have been supported by numerous 
Islamic and Arab organizations (Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Arab league 
and the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries). The Palestinians have been also 
been given support in the U.N. by numerous African and Asian states.
International pressure on Israeli policies in the occupied territories has forced it to 
lesson its repression and to negotiate a possible settlement. Proof of this pressure is the U.S. 
effort to bring Israel to the negotiating table concerning a comprehensive peace settlement 
in the Middle East. Cost of continued ethnic repression would be restricted U.S. military 
and economic aid.
Iran has little cost for victmizing some ethnic minorities. The Baha’is in Iran are con­
sidered religious heretics and between 1978-85 were subjected to economic persecution, 
torture, and the killing of more that two hundred people. Though the Iranian Government 
curbed abuses, the Baha’is will most likely be denied equal rights as long as the Iranian 
Government list them as Heretics (Gurr, 1993:242-244).
Around 300,000 Baha’is live in Iran and three million world wide. Even with severe 
repression the Baha’is in Iran have failed to mobilized for political support. Domestically, 
there has been little if any cost of participating in ethnic national policies that persecute 
Baha’is. They have remained politically passive. International support has been mild for the 
Baha’is. Amnesty International, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and Germany 
(which has a large Iranian Bahaži community) have been applying the most outside pressure 
on Iran.
The total cost of participating in ethnic national policies in Iran, however, is not as low 
as one might expect. Currently, Iran is trying to rebuild its economy after its war with Iraq. 
The government is seeking western support and trying to create a new image of moderation. 
Severe prosecution is too costly for Iran. However, until there is domestic cost or increased 
international cost it is likely that the Baha’is will continue being persecuted.
Cost to Secessionists Groups
There are those who support separatist tendencies because they will personally benefit 
from the new political unit, i.e., Jobs, property, status, etc. For these people the cost repre­
sents a reparation or sacrifices for their future. In the end, they perceive a net gain from 
separatist policies. The largest exogenous variable that will determine the cost to individuals
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who favor separatist policies will be what kind of government they are in opposition to. The 
individual’s cost is usually lower domestically in contemporary democracies.7)
Western democracies often have a constitution that permits legal and peaceful succes­
sion. For example, the Quebec nationalistic movement has experienced comparatively little 
opposition from Canada.8) When Quebec made French the official language and restricted 
the use of English in schools Canada gave little resistance. As clearly indicated by Ottawa 
and as stated in the Canadian constitution, Quebec is free to leave (Gurr, 1993:159-162). 
However, not all of Quebec’s cost is low. The possible disruption of commerce or of subsidies 
is a cost of nationalism. In 1980 the potential of economic losses defeated Quebec’s sove­
reignty referendum (Hechter, 1987:418).
The Palestinians are a another example of the high cost of ethnic solidarity. As stated 
earlier, the Palestinians are subjugated to every form of repression.
Territorial sovereignty does not benefit everyone. Certain groups measure the cost of 
separatist mobilization as a loss of current benefits (jobs, property, status, etc.) For these 
people their current welfare depends on maintaining the status quo. Their best perceived 
interest lies with the current political unit. Many elites might hold positions that are de­
pendent on interregional ties. This was true in the case of Ukraine, where local elites had 
many advancement opportunities.
Organizations
Political parties and ethnic organizations play a major role in determining an individual’s 
participation in ethnic nationalism. Organizations institutionalize ethnic nationalism by re­
ducing transaction cost, providing information about opportunities for mutual cooperation, 
and provide the capability to monitor and sanction free riders.9)
Organizations affect all parts of the cost-benefit equation. An individual’s expected 
benefits from ethnic mobilization will increase if the ethnic organization has a large supply 
of resources. A well-financed national party can offer direct payment, future employment 
or many other benefits. Organizations can determine individual’s estimate of probability of 
success by monoploizing information. Ethnic organizations who control the media and com­
munication sources can manipulate individual’s perception of the probability of success.
The individual’s cost of free riding will rise if the organization has extensive monitoring 
capabilities. Organizations often design strategies to monitor would be- free riders and pro­
mote collective action. All states receive funds by taxes. Political mobilization can be moni­
tored by networks of informers. Authoritarian governments have often used such networks 
that include a hierarchy of professional monitors who overview voluntary or forced monitors. 
Furthermore, monitoring free riding is simplified when public goods (political support) are 
in the open for everyone to see. For example, non-attendace at rallies, meetings, or cele­
brations can easily be monitored. National symbols, showing political suppor* for the :gime, 
can easily be monitored. A flag outside someones home or business, or a picture of a political 
leader in a restaurant can easily be monitored.
Another widely held strategy used by ethnic organizations to mobilize military support 
would be to violently attack an opposing ethnic member or institution. The attack would
7) Theoretical logic in Hechter (1982:424-431); empirical examples in Gurr (1993:159-162).
8* Canada has not threatened armed resistance if Quebec secedes. This is compared to other states that have 
ended in civil war.
9) For a specific discussion of how organizations foster ethnic solidarity see Hechter (1982:412-431). For a more 
general discussion on the role of formal institutions in overcoming collective action problems see Williamson (1975); 
Keohane (1984).
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have a spiral effect. The victimized ethnic group would mobilize for revenge: The member 
of other ethnicgroup would mobilize for defense in anticipation of retaliation. The more 
ethnic members who participate or even passively witness these attacks will undoubtedly 
increase the need for mobilizing defenses. If an individual believes that the attack appears 
to be universal, then the individual will believe that they will be punished regardless if they 
participated or not. Any chance of the individual’s free riding is greatly diminished, because 
if he fails to mobilize he will be at greater risk of injury or death. This kind of strategy is 
especially effective where ethnic groups are heavily mixed. Thus military mobilization would 
then ensure that the individuals incentives coincided with the organizations (Snyder, 
1993b:23-24).
Conclusion: The Identity Continuum
Self-identity is a continuum. Near one end is ethnic identity; toward the other end is 
civic identity. We may always perceive ourselves as a part of an ethnic group, but when will 
our main political cleavages be Ethnic?
This paper has argued that collective action theory can be fruitful in explaining group 
solidarity. The strength of the rational choice approach is that it allows us to systematically 
break down the individual incentives for group solidarity. Understanding group cohesion 
then becomes a process of correctly evaluating the individual’s incentives.
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ETNIČKI IDENTITET I RACIONALNOST
BRAD JOSEPH
U radu se fenomen etničkog identiteta promatra kroz optiku teorije 
kolektivne akcije. Poput ostalih društvenih skupina (plemena, feudalnih 
država, međunarodnih organizacija i si.) i etničke su grupe rezultat individu­
alne analize troškova-i-koristi, čija je svrha maksimiziranje materijalnih sred­
stava i sigurnosti. Eksterne varijable, određene društvenim odnosima, deter­
miniraju individualnu sklonost etnicitetu, to jesi nekom drugom principu 
združivanja.
Kolektivna akcija nije neizbježna posljedica koristi koju grupe 
pribavljaju svojim članovima; pojedinci su motivirani da konzumiraju za­
jedničko dobro, ali ne i da ga ostvaruju. Rigorozna analiza troškova-i-koristi, 
prema autoru, pomaže u objašnjavanju individualnog doprinošenja za­
jedničkom dobru.
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